






How the tax treatment of public pensions and
other instruments of old-age provision effectively
differs across countries is an interesting topic in
itself – certainly for those who are interested in the
design of tax systems at a national level as well as
in a comparative perspective. The progress of eco-
nomic integration adds a new dimension to this
theme. With the increasing intensity of cross-bor-
der activities of firms and their employees, includ-
ing the cross-border activities of those who offer
relevant types of financial services, differences in
taxation potentially influence many of the numer-
ous decisions involved in these international oper-
ations. In particular, this is considered an issue for
EU member countries, where legal entities and
individuals are now rather free to operate and
locate themselves within the European Single
Market.
Not surprisingly, EU level authorities have started
to address the problems that may arise from the
coexistence of different systems of old-age provi-
sion and different national tax codes in a process of
consultation and communication that has so far
generated a limited number of official statements
and directives. The general approach applied to
solving these problems on this level is the so-called
“open method of co-ordination” (as suggested in
the proceedings of the European Council Meeting
in Lisbon;European Council 2000,No.7),while the
precise direction to be taken in related efforts is
still open (see European Commission 1999, 2001).
Against this background, the task of this article is
twofold. First, we will briefly survey the national
systems applied to taxing pensions and other
instruments of old-age provision across the coun-
tries of the EU-15, plus the US and Switzerland.
Second, we will discuss the main reasons why, from
an economic point of view, a higher degree of co-
ordination might be useful in this area, and what
the current stage of affairs really is in terms of EU-
level decision making on this issue. The article
draws heavily on a study prepared by Fenge et al.
(2003), where features of national pension systems
were covered in a much broader perspective,
including their tax treatment and the problems
involved in tax design at both a national and an
international level.
Taxing pensions: a classification of national
systems
Basically, there are three types of transactions that
constitute a pension scheme and thus provide an
opportunity for possible taxation: (i) contributions
or premiums paid to the scheme; (ii) income
derived from accumulated wealth, if any; and (iii)
benefits received or withdrawals made during
retirement. Accordingly, a widely used set of short
forms that can be used to characterise national tax-
ation regimes is given by three-digit combinations
of the letters T (for “taxed”) and E (for “exempt-
ed”), representing the treatment of transactions at
all the three stages mentioned before (see, for
instance, Dilnot 1992, or Whitehouse 2001). For
example, “T E E” is the short-hand for a system
where contributions are taxed, while returns to
investment and pensions are tax-free; “ ETT ”
denotes a system where contributions are tax-
exempt, while fund income and benefits are not.
The taxonomy introduced here has been originally
suggested for occupational pension plans and
other forms of private old-age provision.When it is
applied to public pension schemes, minor modifi-
cation are therefore useful. As, throughout the
world, public pensions are largely unfunded – or as
existing funds are virtually nowhere attributed to
individual accounts – taxing capital yields is not an
option here. For this reason, two-digit combina-
tions like “ T–E ”or “E – T” would form an anal-
ogous set of abbreviations for public pensions. In
fact, there is even a considerable number of public
pension schemes that are financed from the gener-
al government budget and, hence, do not even
involve any ear-marked contributions that could
be subjected to, or exempted from, taxation. In
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these cases, “– – T” or “ – – E” are effectively the
only two options available.
One of the main distinctions between the different
tax regimes that are logically possible is whether, in
terms of the conventional public finance literature,
they correspond to a “comprehensive income tax”or
an “expenditure tax”. The difference between these
two types of arrangements lies in whether fund
income derived at the intermediate stage is taxed
periodically – as it is considered part of an individ-
ual’s comprehensive income tax base – or not.In the
former case, the tax system does not affect decisions
as to how the income is spent in a given period of
time, in particular on consumption vs saving; in the
latter, it encourages saving, but is basically neutral
with respect to consumption today vs consumption
tomorrow. From an economic point of view, this dif-
ference is much more important than whether taxa-
tion is mainly concentrated at the early stages of the
accumulation process (T E E or TTE )or at later
periods of time (E ET or ETT).1 On the other hand,
the difference between the “income” vs “expendi-
ture” tax approach is sometimes exaggerated (see,
for example, Börsch-Supan and Lührmann 2000)
when comparisons are made that are not neutral
with respect to the present value of total tax rev-
enues. If this is imposed as an additional constraint,
the differential impact of the two regimes on labour
supply, saving, economic growth, and other variables
rets on a number of potential behavioural adjust-
ments that are not easy to predict.
In the following,we will first of all apply the simple
way of characterising national tax systems intro-
duced before in order to illustrate existing differ-
ences with regard to how public pensions, occupa-
tional pensions, and fully private provisions are
taxed in different countries. In order to assess the
various systems, one should keep in mind that, as
the general rule embodied in national tax codes,
virtually all of the countries considered here apply
some variant of an “income tax” (sometimes more,
sometimes less comprehensive), not an “expendi-
ture” or “consumption” tax. Thus, any deviation
from this rule for pensions and other old-age pro-
visions can be seen as favourable tax treatment.
The treatment of public pensions
In the majority of cases, public pensions schemes
are formally taxed according to an E – T-type rule
(see table below).As a rule, the share of contribu-
tions paid by employers is considered part of the
payroll and therefore reduces the firm’s taxable
profits; in addition, they are usually not treated as
taxable income on the employees’ side. Similarly,
employees’ contributions are usually subtracted
from the individuals’ income tax base and are thus
made from income before taxes. Exceptions are
Germany and Ireland, where the deductibility of
employees’ contributions is subject to an upper
limit, and the UK and the US where contributions
have to be made from income after taxes.
Consequently, pension benefits accruing later on
are mostly subjected to general income taxation in
a way which, among other things, reflects how con-
tributions were either taxed or went untaxed.
As public pensions are mainly unfunded and do
not involve any capital yields that are attributable
to individual tax-payers, E–Tsystems therefore
appear to be basically consistent with the idea of a
comprehensive income tax. In many cases, howev-
er, there are additional forms of tax breaks related
either to the taxpayer’s age or to “pensions” as a
particular category of income. Sometimes, these
allowances also vary by levels of total income, ben-
efits, etc. As a result, public pensions are often to
some extent, in the case of basic pensions even
fully, exempted from taxation.
These qualifications imply that the short forms
used in the table do not indicate everything that is
worth knowing about the tax treatment of public
pensions at a national level. For instance, the way
things are represented for Germany does not
reveal that public pensions derived from (less-
than) average earnings are effectively tax free if
they are the major source of retirement income.2
Similarly,the information provided for the UK sys-
tem should not be taken to imply that there is a
true double taxation in the strict sense of the word
in this country. Instead, tax liabilities are limited at
both stages so that the total amount of taxes
involved is basically not excessive. This should be
taken as a general caution which also applies to the
short forms used for the tax rules in other coun-
1 For practical reasons, imposing taxes early or later on can, of
course,make a difference – for example,with respect to when pub-
lic revenues are generated. Also, neutrality results with regard to
the timing of taxation – at least for TEE vs EET or for TTE vs ETT
– which are obtained in simple models need no longer be valid
when complications like progressive taxation or inflation (and cold
progression) enter the picture; see Fenge et al. (2003, ch.7). Here,
we will not go into these details.
2 Currently, Germany is considering the transition to an E–T
scheme with a more stringent taxation.tries as well as for the tax treatment of other types
of old-age provision.
The treatment of occupational pensions
In the countries covered here,the dominant form of
taxation of employer-based pensions is EET
(again, see the table).The variant ETTis applied in
Denmark and Italy for some types of occupational
pensions,and in Sweden it is the standard treatment.
In virtually all the countries considered, contribu-
tions made by both employers and employees are
tax-deductible at least to some extent. Again, most
countries do not treat the employers’ contributions
as taxable income of employees. Note, however, the
requirements that have to be met by a pension plan
to qualify for this particular tax treatment are wide-
ly different across countries. Returns to investment
and capital gains that arise from changes in asset
prices are mostly tax-free. Only in some countries
are they subject to capital income taxation.
Irrespective of whether accumulated wealth is
annuitised or withdrawn as a lump-sum, all pen-
sions paid out are generally included in the income
tax base of the recipients. Tax rates and, eventual-
ly, tax breaks differ substantially between coun-
tries. In some countries, lump-sum payments enjoy
a favourable tax treatment, while in contrast they
are generally ruled out in others.
Austria, Germany, and Greece are the only coun-
tries where, as a deviation from the model
described so far, the taxation follows a TEE -pat-
tern for some types of occupational pensions; in
Luxembourg, this is the standard procedure.
The treatment of private provisions
Including a discussion of the tax treatment of fully
private provisions for old-age is difficult for sever-
al reasons.The most important problem is that vir-
tually any kind of savings or wealth can serve as an
instrument for old-age provision – even choosing
an appropriate timing to buy consumer durables
could be seen as a limiting case. Thus, looking at
the tax treatment of private pension plans or annu-
ities alone might be too narrow a view. (In fact,
markets for financial products of these types are
extremely thin in many industrialised economies
because of the predominance of public provision
and other types of saving.) On the other hand, dif-
ferent types of saving, or wealth accumulation, are
often subjected to a very different tax treatment
even within a country – often for reasons that are
not, or not primarily, related to encouraging pri-
vate old-age provision.A very prominent example,
which is nonetheless important, also as a source of
retirement consumption, is certainly owner-occu-
pied housing and wealth in terms of real estate.
Another one is the special rules that are meant to
subsidise wage earners when investing in small
shares of equity capital in general or in own-com-
pany stock in particular.As a consequence, includ-
ing a broad array of instruments of private old-age
provision in this investigation is next to impossible
as it would lead us into a number of distinct areas
of tax rules that would each deserve an in-depth
treatment.
Pars pro toto, we therefore concentrate on the tax
treatment of life-insurance contracts, including
those that are annuitised in the pay-out phase.
Across countries, products of this kind are rather
uniform, even though the regulatory framework
for insurance companies and other providers may
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Austria E – TE  E  T   or  T E E
e)
Belgium E – TE  E  T
Denmark – – T
a)  and  E–T
b) E E T  or  E T T
e)
Finland – – T
a)  and  E–T
b) E E T
France E – TE  E  T
Germany E/T
c) – E/T
d) E E T  or  T E E
e)
Greece E – TE  E  T   or  T E E
e)
Ireland E/T
c) – TE  E  T
Italy E – TE  E  T   or  E T T
e)
Luxembourg E – T T E E
Netherlands E – TE  E  T
Portugal E – TE  E  T
Sweden E – T E T T
Spain E – TE  E  T
Switzerland E – TE  E  T
United Kingdom E/T
c) – TE  E  T
United States T/E
c) – T/E
d) E E T
a) For tax-financed basic pensions. – 
b) For earnings-
related supplementary pensions. – 
c) Tax deductability of
contributions limited. – 
d) Taxation of benefits limited
through special rules (not general tax allowances). –
e) Depending on the type of pension plan.
Note: The three-digit combinations used here to repre-
sent national tax rules indicate whether there is taxation
(T) or tax exemption (E) of transactions at each of the
following stages: (i)  c o n t r i b u t i o n s   o r   p r e m i u m s   p a i d   t o 
t h e   s c h e m e ;   (  i i )   i n c o m e   d e r i v e d   f r o m   a c c u m u l a t e d 
w e a l t h ;   (  i i i )   b e n e f i t s   r e c e i v e d   o r   w i t h d r a w a l s   m a d e 
d u r i n g   r e t i r e m e n t . 
Source: Fenge et al. (2003, ch. 5 and 6).CESifo DICE Report 3/2003 33
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differ. Private life-insurance contracts and annu-
ities are taxed according to ETT , rather than
EET , rules in the majority of cases. In other
words, capital gains are mostly subject to taxation
in this area.Also, even for the narrow set of instru-
ments considered here,the tax treatment of private
provisions is less uniform than in the case of the
other pillars.
Taking  ETTas the most wide-spread case, it
should be mentioned that in Austria, Germany,
France, Portugal, Spain and the US, tax deductibil-
ity of premiums is limited or even absent.
Consequently, these countries – as well as Greece
where premiums are tax-free – do not tax insur-
ance benefits under a number of qualifying condi-
tions, such as insurance period, form of payments,
or age of the insured when benefits are paid out.
Capital gains are tax-free in Austria, Finland,
Greece and the Netherlands. All in all, insurance
premiums are subsidised and/or benefits are sub-
jected to special tax incentives in more than half of
the countries considered, but the precise terms of
the favourable treatment are very different and
thus cannot be represented in the framework of
our very simple scheme.
International co-ordination
Based on the rights to freely move goods, services,
capital, and labour in the Single Market, economic
integration of the EU is becoming more and more
intense. Against this background, national systems
of old-age provision can no longer be taken to be
entirely separate institutions. Instead, they may
create obstacles for further integration, thus con-
tradicting the spirit of the 1957 ECC Treaty and
openly violating current EU-level legislation.
Effectively, the coexistence of different systems of
old-age provision and different tax codes within
the Single Market can run counter to all the four
freedoms laid down in the EC Treaty.
Those who are affected by restrictions of the free-
doms of the Single Market are insured individuals,
their employers, and also financial intermediaries
that are active in the relevant markets. In addition,
any restriction which immediately affects just one
of the freedom rights – free mobility of labour, for
instance – potentially hits the full set of freedoms
through effects on decisions taken by firms and
their customers. Co-ordination problems which are
mainly relevant for labour mobility arise from dif-
fering tax rules for old-age provisions, differing
definitions of membership rules for both public
and employer-based pension schemes and from
difficulties regarding the portability of pension
entitlements, including an effective non-transfer-
ability of accumulated wealth, on an international
level. For first-pillar pensions, an EU-level legal
framework of co-ordinating social law has been in
place for quite some time now, effectively remov-
ing all major obstacles for labour mobility in this
area. An analogous framework for occupational
pensions is however lacking. In the following we
will discuss in more detail the co-ordination prob-
lems of differences in the taxation of pensions.
Discriminating tax treatment
It is easy to see that differences in the acceptance
of tax advantages with respect to domestic and for-
eign providers of old-age pensions are a source of
potential restrictions for free mobility of services,
labour, and capital. Discriminating tax rules mean
that some countries provide tax advantages only
for domestic pension schemes. This may hinder
free mobility of workers if the destination country
does not fully grant tax deductions of contributions
to a pension scheme that the worker wants to
maintain in his origin country. But also free mobil-
ity of services and capital can be obstructed if for-
eign suppliers of pension provisions have to fulfil
special conditions in order to be fully accepted for
tax deductions. In the communication KOM
(2001) 214, the Commission posits that these
obstacles to the Single Market shall be removed.
The principle of “non-discrimination” offers a tool
for EU-level authorities which can be applied to
removing all barriers to labour mobility that are
due to differing approaches to taxing old-age pro-
vision, including different conditions that have to
be met in order to qualify a pension plan for a
favourable tax treatment. Similar barriers that are
relevant for a free flow of services cannot be tack-
led in the same way,as national legislators are fully
responsible for occupational pensions offered
inside their countries. Parallel problems that arise
when insured individuals or insurance services
move from one country to another thus have to be
solved using different approaches. With respect to
the latter type of problems, the Commission limits
its activities to asking national legislators for a
revision of tax rules which hamper cross-bordertransfers of accumulated wealth as they may
restrict the free mobility of capital.
Co-existence of differing tax rules
If instruments of old-age provision are taxed
according to different rules, pensions accruing to
mobile workers (or to pensioners who migrate
after retirement) can be subjected to double taxa-
tion – or, possibly, even tax-free. The Commission
therefore discusses several strategies which can be
adopted to avoid these cases and help national tax
authorities in effectively applying their tax codes
without interfering with the freedoms of the Single
Market. So far, there is no final conclusion as to
what strategy is considered preferable.
Lacking both the responsibility and the ambition
for a true tax harmonisation, the Commission
states it would be desirable if a larger number of
EU countries were to adopt an E E T approach to
taxing instruments of old-age provision.Obviously,
this would facilitate co-ordination. But E E T taxa-
tion can adopt a variety of forms in different coun-
tries.For example,in some countries the amount of
tax-deductible contributions to occupational pen-
sion schemes is made dependent on the contribu-
tions to the public pension system. Different pref-
erences of the EU member states with respect to
the structure of the old-age pension schemes and
the relation between public and occupational pen-
sion schemes may result in significant differences
in the amount of tax-deductible contributions. A
standardisation of the taxation of pensions accord-
ing to the E E T rule would therefore not fully suc-
ceed in removing impediments to mobility.In addi-
tion, the rules of the tax-deductibility of contribu-
tions, capital gains, and benefits would have to be
harmonised across countries in order to allow for a
perfect liberalisation of mobility.
As an alternative, bilateral agreements (in the first
place, existing tax conventions or double taxation
treaties) could be used to find solutions that are
geared to particular co-ordination problems aris-
ing in a specific context.The advantage of bilateral
agreements is that the specifications of each two
pension and tax systems can be taken into account
and co-ordination is much easier than under multi-
lateral or community-wide arrangements. On the
other hand,negotiating and adapting the multitude
of mutual agreements that would be needed could
turn out to be very costly, and a uniform treatment
of identical cases still is not guaranteed.This is true
even if the majority of existing treaties is based on
the OECD Model Tax Convention, which estab-
lishes a different tax treatment for the three pillars
of typical old-age protection systems. Double taxa-
tion treaties between Germany and other EU
countries generally stipulate that occupational
pensions and private provisions are taxed accord-
ing to the country of residence, pensions accruing
to public sector employees and civil servants are
taxed in the source country, while other public
pensions are taxed in either of these countries
depending on the particular case.
Taxation in the source country or residence
country?
From an economist’s point of view, returns on
investments in old-age provision should be taxed in
the country of residence – provided that a taxation
of capital gains is intended at all.The reason is that
this leaves investment decisions unaffected. This
holds true for private old-age provisions where the
person with pension claims is able to decide in
which country the investment takes place. If this is
not the case, as in occupational or public pensions
schemes, where either the employer or the state
undertakes the investment decision it is more
appropriate to prevent the option of pensioners’
evading the tax burden by moving abroad.This can
be done by a taxation in the source country where
the pension wealth will also be taxed even if the
pensioner has moved to another country.
As to the taxation of either contributions or bene-
fits, none of the two approaches that are feasible
turns out to be neutral with respect to the potential
mobility of tax payers.Taxation in the source coun-
try may distort migration decisions taken by work-
ers in their active period of life; taxation in the res-
idence country may distort choices of residence
after retirement. Thus, as Richter and Wiegard
(2001) put it,“distortions of the choice of the work-
ing place have to be weighted against distortions of
the choice of residence in retirement”. In combina-
tion with an E E T approach, implying that taxes
imposed on transactions with a pension plan are
effectively credited until retirement, taxation in the
source country is the only way to make sure that tax
authorities finally get “their” money. At the same
time, taxation in the country of residence is desir-
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able to the extent that taxes are meant to remuner-
ate the public sector for the extra-cost associated
with an additional resident. If there are good rea-
sons for taxing pensions paid across borders in any
one of the two or more countries involved, while
double taxation should be avoided, then splitting
the right to tax between source and residence coun-
tries might be an appropriate solution.
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